The refugee regime' has undergone a radical transformation since the end of the Cold War, dramatically altering opportunities and challenges for the realization of human rights. Some of the changes are related to the Cold War itself. Others grow out of the contemporaneous process of globalization' and individuation,' twin phenomena that radi- 1. The term "refugee regime" at one time referred only to those laws, policies and practices set up to deal with "refugees" as defined by the 1951 Convention on Refugees. As explained below, the regime has become enlarged in scope to cover all those uprooted in war, including "war victims" (all victims regardless of movement) and "displaced people" (those who are displaced from their homes but who remain within their state of origin) and, in addition, the regime now includes many less formal systems and actors that interact with and/or complement the original systems and mechanisms. As used in this essay, "refugee regime" refers to the second, broader definition. Unless otherwise noted, the term "refugee" is used throughout to apply to refugees and displaced people. See James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L. J. 129 (1990) .
2. Zdravko Mlinar has identified five dimensions of globalization: (1) globalization as increasing interdependence at the world level, wherein the activities of people in specific cally transform the statist paradigm and the kinds of challenges encountered by those concerned with the human rights of refugees. These developments are complex. We can say that the shift from a Cold War refugee paradigm 4 to a post-Cold War paradigm has occurred during a time of globalization and individuation. At the same time, however, globalization and individuation have accelerated as the Cold War has deflated. Delineating cause and effect and pinpointing the exact moment of intersections would be an impossible task. We can, however, identify the attributes of this paradigm shift and, within it, locate challenges to the statist paradigm. Through this analysis, we can better understand the field in which human rights and refugee advocates operate and fashion solutions to meet today's problems.
The statist paradigm and its critique have long been central to the agenda of many international law and human rights scholars The dominant approach to international organization, viewing states as the primary unit of analysis and sovereignty as the primary measure safeareas have repercussions that go beyond local, regional or national borders; (2) globalization as the expansion of domination and dependence, that is "an inter-connectedness on the global scale, in which radial rather than lateral links predominate"; (3) globalization as homogenization of the world wherein "instead of differences among territorial units which were mutually exclusive, there is now a uniformity"; (4) globalization as diversification within "territorial communities" wherein "the level of globalization can be measured by the extent to which narrow territorial units are open and permit access to the wealth of diversity of the world as a whole"; (5) globalization as a means of surmounting temporal discontinuities through "(a) connectedness of the asynchronous rhythms of different activities and (b) temporal inclusiveness resulting from the functioning of particular services to global space frames." Zdravko Mlinar, Individuation and Globalization; The Transformation of Territorial 3. By individuation, I refer to "the processes of increasing the autonomy and distinctiveness of the actors at both the collective and individual levels." Mlinar, supra note 2, at 15. Mlinar identifies the dimensions of individuation as: (1) the weakening of predetermination on the basis of origin; (2) the weakening of determination on the basis of territory; (3) increasing the diversity of "time-space paths" (that is, not being limited to the role and position of individuals in space at a specific moment in time); (4) increasing control and decrease of (random) intrusions from the external environment (wherein actors assert greater control over the impulses from the environment); and (5) increased authenticity of the assertion of identity (more direct assertion of identity without the use of intermediaries or representatives). Id. 4. The Cold War paradigm is similar to, but distinct from, the colonialist paradigm. For example, colonialist donors may be more influenced by their desire to perpetuate their culture on the other, see Cecilia Ruthstrom-Ruin, BEYOND EUROPE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF REFUGEE AID 132-135 (Bengt Ankarloo, Sven Tigil, et. al. eds., 1993) (discussing British and French aid to African colonies). This essay will not equate the two, but will instead leave discussion of the colonialist and post-colonialist refugee paradigms to another day. guarding state action within its territories,' has been re-examined, demythologized, and de-constructed This essay adds to the debate through the examination of the refugee regime, an area in which states and notions of sovereignty have always played an important role. It asks two converse questions. First, how does the changed role of the state in today's "globalized"
' society affected the refugee regime? Second, how does today's refugee regime re-figure the role of the state? This article charts the paradigm shift in the refugee regime in the context of these questions.
My thesis is that within the refugee regime the move away from states and adherence to states are two sides of the same coin. To some degree the new refugee regime reflects the trend away from both the state and strict notions of sovereignty. Nonetheless, the new regime also exposes the staying power of the statist paradigm. In many respects, the role of states has indeed been altered, but states have retained their role as important and often essential actors. While other observers have commented on specific geographic or thematic changes in the refugee regime,' this essay attempts to place the paradigm shift within a conceptual framework, and from this framework asks new questions about the nature and future direction of refugee law and policy. These questions must be answered if we are to address protection and assistance concerns of refugees. a simplified model of refugee and aid flows, and is further developed in the first column of Chart A at the end of the essay). Under this model, state boundaries were tied to the very definition of who was worthy of aid and protection.'° Further, the doors of receiving countries were to be open to "refugees," those persons outside their country of nationality who have a well founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, as defined by the 1951 United Nations Convention and its 1967 Protocol." Those who did not fit the definition of persecution, who did not fall within the limited persecution grounds, and who were uprooted" without having crossed state boundaries-the internally displaced-had no recourse to international legal protections and, for the most part, were denied any assistance. ' The traditional approach to refugees was "reactive in the sense that United Nations bodies, specifically the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), became interested in a person or population only when they had become displaced, crossed a border and sought asylum in another state."' 4 Action depended upon the existence of an exiled refugee population desiring resettlement in another state. Sending states were usually paired with receiving states based on ideological and geopolitical interests. Often the cause of uprootedness was linked directly or indirectly to Cold War struggles or, at 12. This essay uses the term "uprooted" to refer to all people who are forced from their homes or otherwise removed or "disrupted" during war. Thus, "uprooted" is a more inclusive word than the legal term, "refugee."
13. For a review of the law of refugee status, see, for example, JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (1991) . Note that the most abundant group is nonconventional refugees who cross borders.
14. UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 1995: IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS 30 (Oxford University Press 1995).
[Vol. 20:59 the very least, political strategic concerns formed a potential state donor's response to uprootedness. In this game, the U.S. was most concerned about its image with regard to the Soviet Union-enticing Soviet scientists and artists to the shores of the U.S., for example, was intended to make Soviet officials squirm." Receiving states had a reason to open their doors: a desire to siphon off refugees from those states that supported the opposing ideology. Receiving countries could use population flows "to discredit both the government or country of origin and to bolster the image of countries granting them asylum." 6 In other situations, Cold Warriors could "take advantage of refugee movements by arming and training some of the people concerned and using them to destabilize the government within their homeland." 17 In the Cold War era, the locus of aid to refugees was usually in the receiving country. There was considerable discussion of the human rights abuses and political ideology that purportedly forced the refugees to flee. Nonetheless, the "international community"" gave little thought to foreign aid designed to contain refugee flows, or to developing or reforming the sending country's infrastructure. Thus, the issue of the receiving government giving its "consent" simply did not arise. 9 The few Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") that did exist played a limited role in the process, apart from carrying out their own government's concerns, and very few truly non-governmental links existed between citizens' organizations and NGOs in sending and receiving states. In short, aid of any type, including asylum, was linked to Cold War foreign policy concerns.20 15 (1995) (citing 1953 National Security Council paper which stated explicitly that it was American foreign policy "to encourage defection of all USSR nationals as well as of 'key' personnel from the satellite countries" as this would inflict a "psychological blow on Communism").
16. UNHCR, supra note 14, at 37.
Id.
(citing the examples of the Nicaraguan Contras in Honduras, the Afghan mujahideen in Pakistan, and the Namibian exiles in Angola).
18. Throughout this essay I use "international community" reluctantly as it has both no meaning and the most precise meaning. International community refers to whatever the reader thinks is the community that acts internationally. When speaking about the international community's concern about human rights, for example, a western reader might call to mind western powers debating western concepts. Large-scale displacements of people are increasingly perceived as presenting regional and international security risks. In Bosnia, for example, return of refugees under the Dayton Peace Accord is considered essential to long-term peace and stability in the Balkans. (1996) . 27. UNHCR, supra note 9, at 3.
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Africa] without reference to the long history of forced displacement in the region." 28 The crossing of international borders is not the reality for the vast number of people who require protection from armed conflict today who remain within state borders but are deemed to be internally displaced populations (IDPs).' 9 The internally displaced present new protection and assistance dilemmas to human rights and humanitarian organizations.
3° While the 1951 Refugee Convention and its protocol may protect those who cross state boundaries, no international conventions exist to protect displaced persons or those otherwise imperiled by war and, thus, this latter group of refugees is more susceptible to the whims of individual states. 3 ' Moreover, in the case of internally displaced people, the very government that caused the displacement often has the primary responsibility for their protection, thus complicating access and provision of protection and assistance." As Roberta Cohen has observed:
Often [the internally displaced] are caught up in internal conflicts between their governments and opposing forces. Some of the highest mortality rates ever recorded during humanitarian emergencies have come from situations involving internally displaced persons. There is ... no one international organization with responsibility for protection and assistance to the internally displaced. 33 Encampments of internally displaced people fall prey to direct physical abuse from domestic military and paramilitary troops. For example, military forces slaughtered thousands of internally displaced people at the Kibeho camp in Rwanda, in an effort to close the camps.34 International laws and policies utterly failed to provide timely protection; international organizations could only step in after the massacre to provide humanitarian assistance. 35 Given today's population flows, donors are hard pressed to determine aid recipients simply by reference to those who cross state boundaries; the criteria for aid now pertain more to need than to state 36 boundaries. Amir Pasic and Thomas Weiss have observed this shift:
When the bounds of territory, authority, and identity-of borders, political arrangements, and ethnic or national solidarities-are both ambiguous and uncertain, they serve as poor guides for action. In other words, it is situations and not categories of victims that should be addressed. Those suffering should receive attention in proportion to their needs whether or not they have been displaced. 37 Increasingly, at the Secretary General and/or the General Assembly of the United Nations' request, the UNHCR extends its mandate to displaced persons and to war victims under their "good offices" jurisdiction. 38 For example, forty percent of the UNHCR-aid recipients in the former Yugoslavia were classified as "war victims," not internally displaced or refugees. 39 Considering displaced people and war victims together, approximately eighty-five percent of the UNHCR's budget for the former Yugoslavia was allocated to populations outside its formal mandate.n°T hus, the locus of aid has changed. Now, the distribution of aid is largely within the country of origin or in a nearby state. The number of situations in which humanitarian aid may proceed with the state's consent is growing. 4 ' A state's arbitrary refusal to provide aid may be considered an abus de droit and may be insufficient to prevent the United
42
Nations from acting. In these cases, protection of the human rights of humanitarian workers and aid recipients is of heightened concern.
35. See S. KLEINE-AHLBRANDT, THE PROTECTION GAP: THE INTERNATIONAL PROTEC-TION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: THE CASE OF RWANDA (1996) .
36. This is not to say that all who are in need receive aid. In Rwanda, for example, the people who stayed were in great need, but they received very little.
37 Paramilitary troops from the Caucasus to the Great Lakes have deliberately targeted international human rights and humanitarian personnel. 43 In some instances in today's intra-state warfare, intervention has proceeded regardless of state consent where either the Security Council authorizes it, 44 or no functioning government is firmly established. New actors complicate this picture. Leading roles are now played by actors which appear both above and below states-including NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and other governmental and non-governmental entities. The UNHCR often "subcontracts out" humanitarian services to these enti-46 ties and to coalitions led by major powers and/or deployed entirely by them. 47 NGOs play an increasingly important role in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. For example, NGOs channel about twenty-five percent of U.S. assistance.4 "'In net terms, NGOs now collectively transfer more resources to the South than the World Bank.' 49 The goals of NGOs differ greatly from states. And, as Richard Falk observes:
[T]he agents of humanitarian intervention are now often actors other than governments, especially transnational citizens associations, operating on a political logic that is shaped almost exclusively by moral considerations-largely an ethos of responsibility and solidarity-that is very different from the statist outlook that guides most governments when they are engaged in humanitarian missions. 5°A lthough NGOs cannot obviate the need for the state, they may provide essential services and aid, and they "create conditions that facilitate the formation of international institutions" and "reinforce the 43 Fall 1998] norms promoted by these institutions through public education as well as through organized attempts to hold states accountable to [them]... In this sense, NGOs can serve to promote human rights norms in the humanitarian sphere. Yet, NGOs are a wild card. For the most part, they are left free to operate unchecked by international law either because such laws do not apply to them, 52 or due to a lack of political will to hold NGOs accountable. 3 As a result, the record of NGOs on protecting, promoting, and following human rights norms in the refugee field is sketchy at best.
The cause of this uprooting has also changed in the post-Cold War Model, reflecting a further shift away from the state. As in the Cold War era, major refugee flows are "deeply rooted in the dominant geopolitical institutions of the global system and are directly or indirectly related to the conflict between the superpowers. '54 However, eruptions of violence are more likely to be internal than interstate, 55 during the Cold War often reflected larger Cold War aims, these struggles are likely to concern secession, state formation, and intra-state powerplays. 57 States are often unable to control these conflicts." Paramilitary troops and leaders of ethno-national political groups play a particularly potent role in the reshaped landscape; like NGOs, these non-state actors are unlikely to be held accountable under international law for human rights abuses.
In several of the recent conflicts, "mass population displacements have not been simply a consequence of armed conflict, but have also been the explicit objective of the warring parties." 59 Thus, "civilians are often used as weapons and targets in warfare, and large-scale displacements comprise a political strategy in claiming control over territory." 6 0 Although Cold War powers used population displacement in their ideological struggles, the promotion of intra-group hatred and forced movement of civilians in today's ethno-national conflicts is an end in itself. "Unable to gain external support for their cause by exploiting rival superpowers, governments and other actors alike have resorted to 'playing the communal card,' a process which has often cumulated in social violence and armed conflict.", 6 ' Today's population movements are "unusually large and speedy. 62 They are often accomplished through gross human rights and humanitarian violations, including "conspicuous atrocity, systematic rape, hostage-taking, forced starvation and seige, the destruction of religious and historic monument, the use of shells and rockets against civilian targets ... and the use of land-mines to make large areas uninhabitable.
Where the state has "failed" 64 or "collapsed, 65 the nature of the conflict is not political in the traditional sense. Often there is no central 
Fall 1998]
authority to which peacemakers may appeal for a solution. It is very difficult for a country to get back on its feet without a strong international presence, including both military and humanitarian actors. That being said, the presence of international and regional entities, which are 66 determined to re-member the state according to their own goals, may contribute to the breakdown of sovereignty and to real and imagined state control. Large-scale displacements of people in the post-Cold War era have prompted individual state and regional organizations to intervene militarily in such countries as Albania, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. 6 7 "Whether such action is taken with or without the consent of the country concerned, and whether it is prompted by humanitarian or strategic considerations, it inevitably has an important impact on the local balance of political and military power., 68 The shift to the post-Cold War refugee paradigm has occurred within the context of globalization, a complex phenomenon which pushes the refugee regime farther away from sole reliance on the state. Some of the trends witnessed by globalization include:
• Increased interdependence of states, specifically in the areas of trade and finance, security, technology and ecological problems, and other issues which contribute to the causes and 67. UNHCR, supra note 9, at 4. Fall 1998] the mystique of state sovereignty and claims of domestic jurisdiction, and a greater willingness to assert and enforce broadly agreed international community policies, interests and values, such as those concerning human rights."" For the refugee regime, this means a greater willingness of international actors to interfere in events taking place within a country, especially when they present matters of humanitarian concern. 79 The behavior of actors in the post-Cold War paradigm thus becomes less "sovereignty-bound" and more "sovereignty-free." 0 Both traditional actors-states-and new actors-NGOs and other transsovereign forces-often act without regard to traditional notions of statehood .
Refugee law and policy thus must adapt to a new environment in which states play a new and often less crucial role than they had played during the Cold War. It would be a mistake, however, to say that states have totally disappeared from the paradigm. As explained below, the refugee regime, and the organizations and entities that operate within it, still must pay heed to the wishes of states.
B. The Post-Cold War Refugee Regime: A Soured Statist Paradigm
States still exercise great control over the needs of the uprooted. What do the uprooted want? In the immediate stage, "protection traditionally means life-saving interventions, fair treatment upon reception, compliance with essential humanitarian standards and non-return to a place of prospective persecution (non-refoulement)." 8 2 Later, however, they want something more: either a safe return home or the start of a new life." Ultimately, they want the root cause of the problem ad-84 dressed so that it never happens again. In all three of these stages, addressing the needs of the uprooted entails the protection and promotion of human rights. For example, the rights to life and freedom from violence are often threatened during flight, in refugee camps, upon resettlement to a third country, -and upon return to the home country. Under the current refugee regime, the state is still necessary for addressing such human-rights concerns. States increasingly cannot or will not free themselves to do so, and non-state actors make attempts with varying degrees of success." As a rule, the greater the state involvement with uprooted persons, the more rights potentially become available." Uprooted people in a refugee camps or "safe areas" have few rights, de jure or de facto. They may not be able to travel, to work, to be educated, or to reunite with their family members. Although an international body can provide an uprooted person with "temporary protection" in a refugee camp in the middle of nowhere (or in an area in conflict), only a state can grant asylum and the rights necessary to start life anew. The 1967 United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum recognized that when a state grants asylum, it is exercising its sovereignty." Adhering to this definition of sovereignty, states maintain a resolute grip over asylum decisions. As Eduardo Arboleda and Ian Hoy observe, states are unlikely to relinquish control over these matters: "Whether we like it or not, it is not to be expected that states will enter into an agreement that would eliminate their right to determine whom they admit within their borders."" 8 In terms of their legal status and rights under domestic and international law, distinctions can be drawn among the internally displaced, retirees, asylum seekers, and stateless people. "[I]n terms of their human needs and the humanitarian issues associated with their plight .... [these groups] share a number of important characteristics." 89 States refuse to relinquish their right to make legal status determinations, but at the same time, states shrink from their responsibility to address such determinations as human needs of the uprooted. This dilemma is drawn out in three interrelated areas: state refusal to grant asylum; the international community's move from protection to containment; and the move of states and the international community from durable to temporary solutions. Each of these will be considered in turn.
State Refusal to Grant Asylum
Western countries view today's uprooted as burdens to avoid, not as populations to be welcomed. Unlike the Cold War refugees, these new arrivals are nonstrategic. B.S. Chimni draws the connection directly, "with the end of the Cold War the firm basis of interest in refugees, particularly from the developing world, has been removed: refugees no longer have ideological or geopolitical value." 0 Would-be receiving states face economic declines and rising xenophobia, racism, antiSemitism, and nativism. 9 ' In closing their borders, states are concerned about the economic burden of new arrivals and the ways in which they will exacerbate already existing racial, ethnic, and national tensions.
Not surprisingly, while the number of asylum-seekers has skyrocketed over the past ten years, fewer and fewer of the uprooted successfully navigate the asylum process. The number of asylum seekers in Europe, North America, and Australia increased from 90,444 in [Vol. 20:59
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Denial for asylum can take three forms. 94 First, would-be receiving states can undertake direct measures aimed at preventing specific groups of people from crossing borders. 9 States may physically turn asylum-seekers back before they cross the frontier, 9 6 0r detain them outside state territory where domestic laws and human rights standards may not be applicable, as some have unconvincingly argued. 97 Second, states can implement indirect measures that make crossing the border more 98 9
difficult, such as visa requirements, carrier sanctions," and the granting of great discretion to border guards. In her exhaustive study of such procedures in Western Europe, Maryellen Fullerton notes that this latter factor is quite significant as the "snap decisions of border guards and airline personnel are virtually unreviewable."'° Raising due process concerns she notes:
The lack of an adequate record of the initial decision, the inability to obtain legal assistance, and the time pressures that prevent gathering evidence to support further the asylumseeker's claim ensure that any appeal that is permitted fails to 95. See, e.g., Thouez, supra note 93, at 89-90 ("Western receiving states are adopting highly restrictive measures to curtail and, to a large extent, restrict the future entry of refugees and asylum-seekers .... Significant trends in migration policy include highly restrictive measures being implemented both at the national and inter-governmental levels, and the general recognition that temporary asylum in the past leads to permanent settlement in the future" Finally, in order to dissuade refugees from advancing upon their borders, states may lower the standards of treatment for refugees within the host country. For example, states routinely deny refugees the right to work, to education, housing and social welfare, as well as their right to family reunification.
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For the tightly packed Western European states, "there has been something akin to a 'trump thy neighbor' phenomenon because nations do not want to appear to have asylum procedures and policies that are perceived by asylum seekers to be more liberal than those of other states, and that might then serve to attract additional migrants."' ' 3 States have used bilateral and multilateral agreements as mechanisms for dealing with the unwanted flow of asylum seekers. For example, Germany has negotiated agreements with Poland and Hungary permitting rejection of asylum applicants at the border if they have passed through a "safe country," defined as "a country that has an asylum process that meets international standards and is not itself a source of asylum seekers." °4 Other European Agreements designed to specify strict rules for adjudicating asylum applications include the Dublin Convention and The Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement.'°5 Such international and regional arrangements 1 0 6 on asylum policy have not triggered a turn away from state sovereignty. Jacqueline Bhabha noted with respect to European harmonization of refugee policy that "[g]enerally, agreement and meaningful steps toward common policy have only occurred in the piecemeal adoption of restrictive measures 102 . See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 11, at 8.
[T]he Convention's capacity for narrow or restrictive interpretation in the highly structured environments of case by case adjudication leaves thousands "outside" or "beyond" protection. They become the objects of ad hoc, discretionary and extra-legal policies that finally benefit no one. Individuals are commonly denied even basic rights, or any opportunity to contribute to their own solution.
which have involved no ceding of sovereignty or reduction in powers of control."' 0 7 Even after these agreements, there is neither a uniform definition of refugee, nor a common set of procedures for processing applications or for instituting appeal rights within Europe. '°8 Far from indicating an abrogation of sovereignty, these agreements indicate the persistence of states' practice of restricting asylum.
The International Community's Move from Protection to Containment
The international community has conspired with powerful would-be receiving states against the uprooted by tacitly joining the campaign against asylum seekers in Europe.' 9 For example, Germany and its neighbors are allies in the "Fortress Europe" by coordinating their restrictive policies against refugees." 0 Instead of emphasizing protection of the uprooted, the international community now trumpets containment-the localization of the problem and restriction of the flow of humanity. The trend toward localization is evident in numerous responses which attempt to keep would-be refugees within their country of origin or neatly packed into border areas of the international countries' own choosing. Interestingly, the UNHCR has made a concerted effort to frame its new policy in terms of an effort to address the root cause of population flows."' In 1992, the High Commissioner declared:
There now exists an urgent need to explore new, complementary protection strategies ... that ... rest on activities principally in the fields of prevention and solutions to refugee problems and depend on an early clarification of the parameters of UNHCR's involvement, particularly inside the country of origin. In practice, the UNHCR's policy has less to do with root causes than it does with keeping refugees in their place-that is, far from the borders of would-be receiving states in the Western world.' 13 Rather than creating new options for uprooted persons, the new focus on containment has served to prevent them from meeting their needs. The case of Bosnia exemplifies the way in which the UNHCR program of "humanitarian action" limited opportunities for the uprooted while nevertheless supporting would-be receiving states' non-admission policies.' "4 One example of this, Guy Goodwin-Gill suggests, is the UNHCR facilitation of persons leaving Bosnia and passing through the sector of Krajina [then Serb controlled] into Croatia proper:
The tight control over departures, coupled with the extent of organization and the emphasis of documentation, meant that there was no spontaneous movement of persons in search of refuge. Clearly, many who wanted or needed to leave Bosnia never made it to the crossing point at the Stara Gradiska bridge. Here, UNHCR's involvement served as tacit endorsement of "organized flight," undermining the individual right to seek asylum, by effectively limiting the opportunities for exit.'" For the uprooted, the UNHCR's self-declared "humanitarianism" limits choices of exit, restricts rights to movement, and creates roadblocks to starting a new life in a new land when conditions back home are too unsafe to return.
With its blessing, the international community now regards human "holding zones" as an acceptable alternative to traditional protection. For example, when Turkey refused asylum to thousands of Kurds after the Persian-Gulf war, the international community reacted by moving the Kurds into a U.N.-protected zone in Iraq."' While the international community did not condemn Turkey for failing to abide by its sovereign responsibilities to grant a right to seek asylum, the international community did instruct Iraq to allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations. Although Iraq initially objected to the humanitarian arms of these liberation movements with relief aid, which was transported, from Sudan into Eritrean-and Tigrean-controlled areas of Ethiopia.
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In like manner, donor governments can use refugee camps in border areas as camouflage for providing "their side" with aid. Although similar manipulation of refugee populations occurred during the Cold War, today it is less clear who is supporting guerrilla groups in refugee camps and why.
22
Thus, the retreat from protectionism not only helps states avoid an influx of unwanted peoples, but it also serves their strategic purposes. By supporting containment, the international community aids wouldbe receiving states in achieving their goals. For refugees, however, incountry protection and border-area holding camps are no solution."' "[T]hose people who attempt to take refuge in a neighbouring or nearby state increasingly find that they simply swapped one situation of insecurity with another."' 2 4
3. From Durable Solutions to a Temporary Arrangement or Repatriation Three "durable solutions" to refugee crises are usually considered: voluntary repatriation, local integration into the country of asylum, and resettlement in a third country. With the doors of would-be receiving states tightly closed, attention has turned to imposed re-settlement in near-by countries and, in particular, to financial contributions to "first asylum" states (meaning, keeping African refugees in near-by African
Alternatively, if the refugees have made it to Western countries, the goal becomes a temporary arrangement and/or the repatriation of refugees.
The may be one method, the imposition of these solutions, denying as it does fundamental human rights, create more problems than they solve.").
[Vol. 20:59 ian grounds,26 and are thereby granted a status known variously as "leave to remain" or "humanitarian status."' ' 27 However, conflicting messages are sent to asylum seekers and the asylum-providing public. The denial of asylum applications sends a message to the general public that the claims made by the new arrivals are not warranted; that these people do not have a well-founded fear of persecution, they just want to improve their lives. 128 The message to would-be asylum-seekers is that one must simply make it over the border, as the country will be reluctant to return them once they arrive.
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Given state reluctance to grant asylum, various forms of temporary protection have become "the link between non-refoulement [the obligation to not send those in flight back to a place in which they would be endangered] and a durable solution."' 3° There are three purposes behind temporary protection:
(1) To save administrative and economic resources through the absence of a full asylum procedure assessing individual claims, but applying a prima facie group determination. (2) Politically it becomes easier to return the refugee if the situation in the country of origin changes, for then it is not a question of withdrawing a residence permit but rather of not renewing it. In this way, a state sends a signal to the refugee that his or her stay in the specific country is only temporary. (3) Finally, the state sends a signal to the public at large that this refugee situation is purely a matter of protection with no elements of voluntary migration. 3 ' All of these purposes serve the interests of the receiving countries while neglecting the needs of the uprooted. The uprooted cannot last in a holding pattern forever. After a while, they want to get on with their lives, to return home, or start a new life in a new country. Temporary protection denies these needs.
The goal of temporary protection is to treat the uprooted minimally well, lest they cause civil unrest in their new country, but not too well, so that they "keep[] his or her mind open to the possibility of returning home." ' 11 2 The ways in which governments prevent the temporarily protected from becoming too comfortable varies from country to country. In particular, the right to work and the right to family reunion, access to education, and the amount of social and relief payments may differ from that accorded to other foreigners in the country. Moreover, no country will issue travel documents to those under temporary protection. 1 3 3
After or instead of temporary protection, many states seek to repatriate refugees, often with the assistance of the UNHCR. Since the 1980s, the UNHCR has recognized "voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution to refugee problems."' ' 34 This often boils down to returning refugees into areas still in conflict. 3 5 These practices threaten to violate the principle of non-refoulement.1 3 The pre-conditions for the participation of the U.N., states, or other actors in voluntary repatriation should include such factors as "fundamental change of circumstances, voluntary nature of the decision to return, tripartite agreements between the state of origin, the host state and UNHCR, and return in safety and dignity."' 3 Above all, this means that participants in voluntary repatriation should not return refugees if their fundamental human rights are endangered.' States often attempt to rush refugees back home before they meet these conditions."' The return of refugees from Haiti, 40 134. UNHCR, supra note 14, at 31 (1995). In the beginning, the UNHCR's approach continued to concentrate ... in countries of asylum: registering potential returnees, verifying that their departure was genuinely voluntary and arranging their transport home. Once they had crossed the border into their homeland, they were considered to be the responsibility of their own state and therefore ceased to be of international concern.
Id. Today, the UNHCR's focus on repatriation purportedly carries the concern with containment back into the country of origin. By failing to provide adequate protection for refugees-and, in particular, by making the conditions of temporary protection miserably inadequate-states also indirectly send refugees home. "Why would adequately protected and nourished refugees return home during conflict conditions to a country ruled by the government that originally caused the flight?"' 44 The primary cause of so-called "voluntary repatriation" is the host state's unwillingness to provide for and protect refugees.
States, the UNHCR, and other international actors work together in the move from durable to temporary solutions. States come out as winners in the process: above all, states retain control over their borders. For the uprooted, however, temporary protection and a quick return home are not effective solutions by any means. Refugees forcibly returned to their homes in conflict zones in Burundi, Sudan, or Kosovo, for example, are all likely to be confronted with threats to their fundamental human rights. By uncovering a limited yet tenacious role for the state, the post Cold-War paradigm shift in the refugee regime does not resolve such problems, rather this paradigm shift merely changes the field in which human rights advocates can fashion responses.
CONCLUSION: NEW QUESTIONS
Today's refugee regime is paradoxically part of the globalization process and an exception to this process. At first glance, the shift from a Cold War to a post-Cold War refugee regime appears to signify a move away from the state. The role of the state mutates and diminishes with the entry of new non-state actors into the international arena, including powerful NGOs. For example, states and international actors enhance
